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Summary
Both supporters and critics of the current tax advantages enjoyed by U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs)
bolster their arguments with appeals to patriotism: the MNCs and their political supporters argue that
allowing inversions or other similar arrangements and instituting another tax holiday for “repatriating”
overseas earnings are good for the American economy as a whole; opponents condemn these tax advantages
as unpatriotic in depriving the U.S. of enormous sums of needed revenue. But where, precisely, is the “home”
to which profits held offshore return? For many purposes, home is where the shareholders are. Determining
ownership of U.S. MNCs such as Apple and GE, however, is extremely hard to do. Appeals for policies that
promote U.S. competitiveness by presuming U.S. ownership of U.S. incorporated parent companies rest, in the
end, on very little.
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As American as Apple Inc.: 
Corporate Ownership and  
the Fight for Tax Reform
In October 2015, the largest U.S. pharmaceutical company by revenue, Pfizer, 
announced plans to merge with Dublin-based giant Allergan, noting that a 
primary driver of the deal is the ability for Pfizer to avoid U.S. corporate taxes.
As Pfizer explained in a press release, “the combined 
company would generate more than $2 billion in savings 
over the first three years and would enjoy a tax rate of 17 
to 18 percent—far less than Pfizer’s current corporate 
tax rate of 25 percent” as a U.S. company.1 The proposed 
Pfizer-Allergan deal is one of many corporate inver-
sions in the past two decades undertaken by companies 
with the ability and size to shift profitable business lines 
to offshore, tax-friendly nations. These inversions raise 
important questions about the ownership of U.S. multi-
nationals that will be addressed in this Issue Brief, based 
on a previous publication by Professor Chris 
William Sanchirico of Penn Law, “As American as 
Apple Inc.: International Tax and Ownership Nation-
ality,” Tax Law Review, Vol. 68, No. 2, 2015, pp. 207-
274 (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2394227). 
A number of legislative proposals and administrative 
actions have been introduced with the intent to curb the 
practice of inversions, as recently as November 2015, 
when the Treasury Department issued actions (build-
ing on regulatory measures established in September 
of 2014) to further reduce the tax benefits of corporate 
inversions. Yet the race to end inversions begs a more 
SUMMARY
• Both supporters and critics of the current tax advantages enjoyed 
by U.S. multinational corporations bolster their arguments with 
appeals to patriotism: the MNCs and their political supporters 
argue that allowing inversions or other similar arrangements 
and instituting another tax holiday for “repatriating” overseas 
earnings are good for the American economy as a whole; 
opponents condemn these tax advantages as unpatriotic in 
depriving the U.S. of enormous sums of needed revenue.
• But where, precisely, is the “home” to which profits held offshore 
return? For many purposes, home is where the shareholders 
are. Determining ownership of U.S. MNCs such as Apple and 
GE, however, is extremely hard to do. The available data are 
either incomplete or opaque.
• It is clear that the current corporate tax regime needs to be 
improved. But appeals for policies that promote U.S. competi-
tiveness by presuming U.S. ownership of U.S. incorporated 
parent companies rest, in the end, on very little.
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fundamental question: When we 
speak of U.S. multinational corpora-
tions (MNCs), what do we mean by a 
“U.S.” company?2 More specifically, to 
what extent are U.S. companies owned 
by U.S. shareholders and to whom are 
the tax benefits accruing? As we will 
see, no one—not the U.S. government 
or even the very companies benefitting 
from foreign tax shelters—can truly 
answer this question.
Firms that have undergone inver-
sion or, like Apple, Cisco, GE, and 
Google, that have exploited other 
tax-advantaged structures such as the 
“double Irish, Dutch sandwich,” do so 
under the rallying cry of maintaining 
their international competitiveness.3 
These MNCs and their political sup-
porters stress that being forced to pay 
comparatively high U.S. tax rates in an 
intensely competitive global environ-
ment places significant burdens on 
their businesses—and, by implica-
tion, on the U.S. economy as a whole. 
Likewise, these MNCs have lobbied 
for another “tax holiday” similar to 
the one they enjoyed in 2005, when 
U.S. multinationals were permitted to 
“repatriate” their earnings to the U.S. 
at a significantly reduced tax rate: 5.25 
percent instead of 35 percent. With-
out a tax holiday, they argue, U.S. mul-
tinationals have no incentive to bring 
their accumulated overseas profits 
back to the U.S., where they could be 
used to hire more American workers 
and suppliers.
Many stakeholders, including 
politicians, taxpayers, and domesti-
cally-based U.S. businesses, wish to 
reform this status quo. They see the 
existing tax advantages as inefficient 
and unfair—for why should large, 
technology-intensive, multi-national 
companies be able to avail themselves 
of special tax benefits while other U.S. 
businesses, by virtue of their immobil-
ity or industry, pay full freight? But 
more than that, they condemn them 
as inherently unpatriotic in depriving 
the U.S. of enormous sums of needed 
tax revenue. 
However, if the argument of 
U.S. MNCs is that their interna-
tional competitiveness, and the U.S. 
economy generally, will improve by 
allowing inversions or other simi-
lar arrangements and by instituting 
another tax holiday, and that these 
imperatives should guide the country’s 
tax agenda, it seems altogether reason-
able to ask whom it is exactly these 
measures would benefit. As this Issue 
Brief will address in more detail, a 
clear picture of the ownership of these 
MNCs is extremely elusive.
IDENTIFYING WHAT 
SHAREHOLDERS WANT  
AND WHO THEY ARE
The appeal for corporate tax reform 
often manifests itself in a campaign 
for a repatriation tax holiday, or a 
reduction in the tax rate for “bringing 
home” the profits of U.S. companies’ 
foreign subsidiaries, ostensibly to 
reinvest the earnings in companies’ 
respective workforces, research efforts, 
physical capital, etc. In general, when 
a U.S. parent company wishes to 
extract profits from a foreign subsid-
iary, it must cause its subsidiary to pay 
a dividend that is generally taxable to 
the parent at the full U.S. corporate 
tax rate of 35 percent. With such 
accumulated profits in the trillions 
of dollars, it is clear why a reduction 
in the repatriation tax is attractive to 
many U.S. MNCs.4
But where, precisely, is this “home” 
to which profits held offshore will be 
returning? For many purposes, home 
is where the shareholders are. But 
where are they?
The first step in identifying the 
nationality of firm ownership begins 
undoubtedly with the economic 
research on “home country bias.” This 
well-known academic theory docu-
ments—and attempts to explain—the 
 1  h t tps : / /www.wash ing tonpos t . com/news/wonk /
wp/2015/11/23/pfizer-and-allergan-to-merge-in-160-bil-
lion-inversion/. 
 2  Many bills related to corporate tax reform have already been 
introduced in the 114th Congress. HR 415, S 198 and S 
174 all treat mergers as U.S. firms if the U.S. shareholders 
maintain control of the resulting entity; HR 1809 and S 975 
would keep inverted firms from receiving federal contracts, 
and S 922 and HR 1790 would restrict inversions. There 
have been many other similarly targeted legislative propos-
als in prior Congresses.
 3  This structure describes the repositioning of highly profit-
able business lines of U.S. companies in foreign countries 
via the incorporation of new, offshore subsidiaries with the 
singular purpose of dramatically lowering corporate tax 
bills. In recent years, several MNCs (notably Apple) have 
reincorporated some of their most profitable subsidiaries in 
Ireland, which has maintained lax tax statutes well-suited for 
the exploitation of low-tax or no-tax islands like Bermuda or 
the Caymans. It is critical to note, however, that the laws and 
rules governing these loopholes are voluminous, scattered 
across several countries, and constantly changing.
 4  It may be helpful to think of this structure as similar to an 
Individual Retirement Account (IRA). Income placed within 
an IRA is untaxed upon earning, grows tax free, and is taxed, 
along with the growth, upon withdrawal. The present dis-
counted value of a total tax bill, under both the double Irish, 
Dutch sandwich and an IRA, may be significantly reduced if 
earnings accumulate and are reinvested over a long enough 
time period.
NOTES
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phenomenon that individuals tend 
to overinvest in home country stocks 
relative to foreign country stocks. For 
example, U.S. investors invest dispro-
portionately in U.S. stocks. 
Economists have offered many 
explanations for this phenomenon, 
citing causes like regulatory barri-
ers, tax disincentives, transaction 
costs, foreign exchange risk, and local 
risks that might be better hedged by 
owning domestic stocks. But none of 
these seem capable of explaining the 
observed magnitude of overinvest-
ment in home country stocks. 
The explanations that seem more 
viable concern corporate or national 
governance risk, information asym-
metry (i.e., the possibility that inves-
tors have less information concerning 
companies in foreign countries), and 
irrational biases, such as the possibil-
ity that unfamiliarity with a foreign 
company leads to unjustified fear  
of investing—although it can be dif-
ficult to distinguish between these  
three explanations.
But there is a critical and over-
looked point with respect to this 
literature that is prevalent in the 
messaging from U.S. MNCs and their 
lobbyists, namely that the theory 
itself does not distinguish between 
a purely domestic U.S. company and 
a multinational corporation. The 
multi-nationality of large U.S. MNCs 
presumably brings to potential foreign 
investors both rationally process-able 
information and irrationally process-
able familiarity. Do information asym-
metries and feelings of unfamiliarity 
apply to global companies like Apple 
and Google? After all, if a citizen of 
Germany, Brazil, or China wanted 
to learn about home country bias, 
they likely could Google it on their 
iPhone. Indeed, the most accepted 
explanations for “home country bias” 
seem themselves to argue for MNC 
exceptionalism because these firms are 
“cognitively domestic,” due to their 
global familiarity. Since U.S. MNCs 
frequently cite the home country 
bias literature as a defense of their 
domestic and patriotic ownership, it 
is important to know that this line of 
reasoning seems particularly inappli-
cable to their particular situation. 
THE MISSING NUMBERS
The next recourse for breaking out 
firm ownership is to do so by scratch, 
using raw data. Unfortunately, this is 
an exercise in futility, as the data do 
not exist. The companies themselves 
almost certainly do not know who 
owns their shares since shareholders 
often do not register directly with an 
issuer. Using Wall Street parlance, 
these companies often know only the 
“street name,” which is to say  
the name of the brokerage used by  
the shareholder.
Various U.S. federal agencies do 
collect data on cross-border securities 
holdings, including foreign holdings 
of U.S. stocks. The Treasury Interna-
tional Capital (TIC) system collects 
data on “portfolio holdings” of foreign 
residents who hold less than 10% 
of any single company’s stock.5 The 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, part of 
the U.S. Department of Commerce, 
collects data on “direct investment” 
(10% ownership or greater).
The TIC reported that the portion 
of U.S. equity (by value) held by for-
eigners in 2014 was 14.5%.6 Despite 
the nearly maximal response rates to, 
and the thoroughness of TIC surveys, 
there are serious concerns with TIC 
data.7 One such concern is so-called 
“custodial bias,” which highlights the 
reality that oftentimes only the coun-
try of residence of a foreign custodian 
bank is recorded in the surveys, not 
the country of residence of the account 
owner. Furthermore, the 14.5% figure 
is a ratio: foreign holdings of U.S. 
equity divided by total U.S. equity. TIC 
only collects data on the numerator. It 
 5  The TIC is a joint initiative of the Treasury, the Federal 
Reserve, and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and it 
collects the majority of its data from U.S.-resident broker-
dealers and custodian banks. The TIC shares some of its 
data with the International Monetary Fund’s Coordinated 
Portfolio Investment Surveys (CPIS), but unfortunately sev-
eral economically advanced countries do not reciprocate, 
including China and many Middle East oil-exporting nations, 
limiting the accuracy of TIC data.
 6  TIC, Foreign Portfolio Holdings of U.S. Securities, April 2015, 
available at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-
chart-center/tic/Pages/fpis.aspx. 
 7  See note 96 in Sanchirico’s paper (http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2394227) for a hypothetical 
scenario illustrating TIC data limitations.
 8  This industry amounts to a full 25% of all foreign holdings in 
U.S. equities.
 9  See notes 165-166 in Sanchirico’s paper (http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2394227) for more 
on mutual fund reporting. 
 10  Investment Company Institute, 2013 Investment Company 
Fact Book, available at https://www.ici.org/pubs/fact_books.
 11  U.S. Treasury department, Office of Financial Research, 
2013, available at http://financialresearch.gov/reports/files/
ofr_asset_management_and_financial_stability.pdf. 
 12  The Tax Policy Center estimates in their models that share-
holders bear between 60-70% of the corporate tax burden, 
so the implicit assumption is that shareholders would re-
ceive 60-70% of the benefit from a repatriation tax holiday.
 13  Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code—Part 2 
NOTES 
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would be a monumental and ulti-
mately fruitless endeavor to attempt 
to obtain data for the denominator on 
the same basis as the numerator, and 
therefore this is not done. The results, 
then, can be assessed quite fairly as 
crude estimates. Finally, in the TIC-
denominated industry, “Capital Mar-
kets (including Mutual Funds),” the 
TIC is unable to identify and separate 
the domestic owners from the foreign 
owners of U.S. equities underlying the 
mutual fund holdings reported in their 
surveys.8 In other words, there is fund 
opacity. The combination of TIC data 
limitations and fund opacity make it 
nearly impossible to determine the 
ownership of large U.S. MNCs.
There are, however, more data 
sources to evaluate. Googling “Who 
owns Google?” provides some use-
ful information from SEC Form 13F 
about the “ownership” shares of large 
institutional investment managers 
(IIM) in the company. But there are 
significant 13F reporting gaps that are 
not immediately clear when looking a 
table of IIM shares on Yahoo! Finance 
or NASDAQ. For a company like 
Apple, that represents a roughly 40% 
reporting gap (as of March 2015). 
Also, as it turns out, the enforcement 
of 13F reporting is relatively weak 
compared to TIC reporting. None  
of this finally matters, as Form 13F 
was designed to reveal the portfolio 
choices of large portfolio managers, 
not characteristics like the national-
ity of the ultimate owners. The IIM 
reports merely the total holdings of 
a given stock across all the funds and 
accounts over which it has invest-
ment discretion. It does not reveal 
the nationality of those for whom it 
managing investments.
The SEC administers two other 
sources of potentially useful data for 
determining the foreign ownership 
share of large U.S. MNCs. The first 
of these two reporting regimes is for 
registered management investment 
companies, or mutual funds, on Forms 
N-Q and N-CSR. The second is for 
registered investment advisers (RIA) 
on Forms ADV and PF. While it is 
not unreasonable to assume that U.S. 
mutual funds have predominantly 
U.S. ownership,9 there appears to be 
a significant amount of ownership of 
U.S. equity that is not accounted for 
by U.S. mutual funds – about 72%, 
according to the Investment Company 
Institute, the national association of 
investment companies.10 As for regis-
tered investment advisers, Form ADV 
requires only that they list their total 
“regulatory assets under management 
(AUM),” a single figure represent-
ing both domestic and foreign clients 
that includes stocks, bonds, and other 
types of securities. 
Additionally, RIAs tend to 
manage a substantial amount of 
their regulatory AUM in “separate 
accounts” available to wealthy indi-
viduals and large institutions. A recent 
Treasury report found that about 43% 
of assets managed by RIAs reside 
in these separate accounts, which is 
problematic for our present purpose. 
Not only do the top five asset man-
agement companies alone manage 
$5.5 trillion in separate accounts, but 
also data for separate accounts are 
not reported publicly.11 Then there is 
the issue of private funds, inclusive of 
hedge funds, private equity funds, and 
venture capital funds. According to 
the Treasury, these appear to be about  
half the size of separate accounts in 
terms of regulatory AUM. The Dodd-
Frank Act required RIAs to release a 
wealth of insightful information about 
private funds, including the foreign 
status of fund ownership. Unfortu-
nately, little is revealed about a fund’s 
actual portfolio.
The final potential source of 
foreign ownership data comes from 
tax reporting and arises in connection 
with the tax paid by foreign inves-
tors on U.S. company dividends. The 
NOTES
(Apple Inc.): Hearing Before the Permanent Subcommittee 
on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & 
Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. 35-37, 152-91 (2013), 
available at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/
investigations/hearings/offshore-profit-shifting-and-the-us-
tax-code_-part-2.
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tax in question is remitted by the U.S 
payor of the dividend rather than the 
foreign payee, hence the more com-
mon name of this tax: the withhold-
ing tax. For every foreign payee each 
year, a U.S. withholding agent (e.g., a 
commercial bank or a brokerage firm) 
must file a Form 1042-S listing the 
dollar amount of dividends paid to 
such a payee during the year. At this 
point, it is perhaps unsurprising to 
discover that problems akin to cus-
todial bias—observed in TIC data—
plague this IRS data. Then again, it 
was never the intention of 1042-S to 
record the foreign ownership share of 
U.S. MNCs. Many of these report-
ing regimes are cleverly designed and 
extremely detailed, but none ever 
sought to answer the foreign owner-
ship question, and none offers answers 
serendipitously. 
A HEALTHY  
BRAINSTORMING EXERCISE
Given all of the data limitations 
detailed above, consider this question: 
can it be said with reasonable confi-
dence that at least 50% of shareholders 
of large U.S. MNCs are U.S. citizens? 
No, it seems that it cannot. We simply 
do not know. Accordingly, the U.S. 
MNCs arguing for lower tax rates on 
the basis of spillover benefits to the 
U.S. economy make a specious case 
when they assume U.S. ownership, 
especially when one considers the 
outcome that the United States could 
receive less revenue overall, as lower 
rates would apply to all domestically 
domiciled businesses. The same is 
true of a repatriation tax holiday. This 
policy option assumes that profits will 
come into and improve the U.S. econ-
omy. But what if that does not hap-
pen? Most of the repatriated profits 
may well go to shareholders and not 
workers, which is what happened dur-
ing the 2005 repatriation tax holiday, 
so knowing who shareholders are and 
where they live would aid significantly 
in determining which national econo-
mies will reap the greatest shares of 
the earnings from another holiday.12
Moving past a nationalistic line 
of reasoning based on competitive-
ness and acknowledging that there is 
a lack of data to support the owner-
ship claims of many large U.S. MNCs, 
what remains is a basic Keynesian 
question: if the goal is to stimulate 
the U.S. economy, is a repatriation tax 
holiday or lower corporate tax rate 
the optimal solution? Why not labor 
This figure highlights the percentage of sales broken down by geography—U.S. sales (blue bars) and non-U.S. 
sales (red bars)—of the ten U.S. MNCs with the greatest amount of earnings held outside the U.S. as of 2012. 
The dollar values associated with each of these companies (X axis) represents their respective amount of foreign 
profits reinvested indefinitely. The Average bars on the far right of the graph describe the average sales of only 
these ten companies. They are provided simply to demonstrate the variability of estimates that one could use 
as a proxy for international ownership of U.S. MNC stocks, based on takeaways from the home country bias 
literature presented in this Issue Brief. For instance, given the familiarity of these ten companies overseas, in ad-
dition to the absence of precise shareholder ownership data outlined throughout this piece, an argument equally 
valid and likely equally flawed could be made to support an assumption of 57% foreign ownership of U.S. MNC 
equities. Compared to estimates from the TIC, this is a substantial difference. 
Sources: Foreign profits data can be found in Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code – Part 2 (Apple Inc.): 
Hearing Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Govern-
mental Affairs, 113th Congress, 35-37, 152-91 (2013); Sales data by geography gleaned from each company’s 
most recent 10-K, as of December 14, 2015.
FIGURE 1: SALES OF THE 10 COMPANIES WITH THE GREATEST FOREIGN  
PROFITS, INDEFINITELY REINVESTED (2012)
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incentives or infrastructure policies 
or greater R&D tax breaks? The 
burden of proof seems to rest with 
those championing another holiday 
or lower rates. Proponents should 
be able to prove U.S. ownership, but 
that is not possible under the current 
reporting regime. The TIC, SEC, 
and IRS would have to synchronize 
their reporting requirements with the 
explicit goal of seeking to answer this 
question of ownership, but that is 
unlikely to happen. Therefore, proxies 
for U.S. ownership should be robust 
if the appeal is “help us compete.” 
None qualify at the moment, includ-
ing the often-cited 14.5% foreign-
ownership figure from the TIC. 
It does not suffice merely know-
ing the percentage of U.S. equity 
issued by large U.S. MNCs, on the 
one hand, and the percentage of U.S. 
equity owned by foreigners, on the 
other. Rather, one needs informa-
tion that narrows focus along both 
dimensions simultaneously. Given 
what we know about home coun-
try bias and how it argues against 
itself in regard to MNCs, the 57% 
foreign-ownership proxy implied by 
the international revenues of U.S. 
MNCs known to have large hold-
ings of foreign earnings (see Figure 
1) may be just as valid a figure and 
just as flawed.13 The point simply is 
that numbers may not offer a way 
forward in this debate. 
CONCLUSION
The current corporate tax regime 
needs improvement. The structures 
that large, technology-intensive com-
panies can and do exploit through 
the double Irish, Dutch sandwich 
continue to allow for low-taxed 
MNCs to build up their IRAs (using 
the analogy from above) and benefit 
from tax breaks that companies of 
smaller size and/or different industry 
cannot access. But appeals for poli-
cies that promote U.S. competitive-
ness and that rely on U.S. ownership 
of U.S. incorporated parent compa-
nies rest, in the end, on very little. If 
Congress decides to pick winners, 
they should at least know who owns 
the horses in the race.
publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu
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